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Chapter 3
How Demographic Change
Will Drive Benefits Design
Marjorie Honig and Irena Dushi
This is a time of profound change in the American labor force. The work-
force is older than ever before. Growing awareness of increased life expec-
tancy is focusing attention on the Wnancial demands of longer lifetimes and
may induce delayed retirement. This Wnancial motivation is reinforced by
the rising age of eligibility for full Social Security beneWts, pension conver-
sions to age-neutral wealth accrual proWles, and increasingly, employer cut-
backs in retiree health insurance beneWts (see Lofgren, Nyce, and Schieber
this volume). Women comprise an increasing share of the labor force at all
ages, drawing greater attention to their need to balance family and work
responsibilities. Finally, the racial and ethnic composition of the popula-
tion is changing, altering the mix of cultural attitudes toward family and
work (Riche this volume).
This chapter examines how the aging of the labor force and its chang-
ing composition will inXuence the future demand for employer-sponsored
beneWts. We investigate the age, sex, racial, and ethnic patterns of demand
for employer-sponsored 401(k) plans, health and disability insurance, and
family-oriented beneWts, and evaluate their implications for the desired mix
of beneWts in the future. We focus here on beneWts that tend to be discre-
tionary for the employee; that is, we exclude beneWts such as pensions and
paid vacations that, if offered, are provided to all covered employees at a
workplace (Mitchell this volume). We also focus our analysis on beneWts
that impose an explicit cost to the employee in terms of contributions,
deferred compensation, or foregone alternative beneWts. This is so that we
can separately identify demand for these beneWts from the demand for
other characteristics of the job, to the extent possible. 
Employer-Sponsored Saving: 401(k) Plans
Plans such as 401(k)s in the private sector (and 403(b) plans in the public
and nonproWt sectors) are voluntary individual savings accounts, to which
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employers and employees may contribute. These are a form of deWned con-
tribution plan and permit tax deferral of employee contributions.1 Taxable
income is reduced by employee contributions up to a limit of $11,000 in
2002 (gradually increasing to $15,000 by 2006), and the allowable total
of employee and employer contributions will rise from 50 percent of the
employee’s salary in 2002 to 100 percent in 2011 and thereafter.2 Invest-
ment returns are tax-free and withdrawals are taxed as income. Withdrawals
prior to age 591/2 incur a 10 percent tax penalty if they are not rolled over
into another qualiWed account. Employers who contribute into these ac-
counts may make either a Wxed contribution, or they can match part or all
of employee contributions.
To determine how an aging labor force might alter the demand for
employer-provided savings mechanisms such as 401(k) plans, we ask whether
age per se appears to inXuence the decision to participate in such plans,
after controlling for other economic and demographic factors that might
inXuence these decisions. An economic life cycle model of saving behavior
would predict that workers borrow against future earnings early in their
work lives, to Wnance family formation and the purchase of homes. During
middle age, they start to consume less than they earn, permitting them to
pay off debts and begin accumulating assets. These assets accrue interest, to
be reclaimed and consumed later, when workers’ abilities or tastes for work
are diminished. Tax considerations also play a role, since the value of tax-
deferred saving rises with income. For this reason older persons may con-
tinue to save even beyond retirement. A desire to leave a bequest, along with
increased longevity, may also extend the saving period among older persons. 
In the United States, 401(k) plans are discretionary for employees in the
sense that decisions regarding participation and current contributions are
not directly tied to the employment decision (unlike automatic enrollment
in deWned beneWt and non-401[k] deWned contribution plans). To analyze
how age inXuences the demand for 401(k) plans, we undertake statistical
analysis of pension participation by age. SpeciWcally, we ask whether em-
ployees offered plans are enrolled (have a nonzero balance), and, condi-
tional on having an account, whether they expect to contribute to accounts
during the year. Since employees may enroll in plans at any time, and those
with previously established plans can opt to cash out account balances
(usually with a penalty) or decide not to make further contributions to an
account, their participation at any given age reXects current interest in this
form of saving. 
We analyze the employee decision to participate in a 401(k) plan as a
function of plan features, Wrm characteristics, and characteristics of the
individual reXecting his or her life cycle stage, liquidity position, and time
preference. In addition to age, we include a number of demographic char-
acteristics expected to inXuence the saving decision including sex, race,
ethnicity, marital status, and education. We are particularly interested in
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whether the decision to participate in a 401(k) differs by sex because of
the increasing proportion of women in the older labor force. Measures
of income and wealth (earnings, spouse earnings if married, and home
ownership) are included because higher income is likely to be associated
with lower liquidity constraints and with larger beneWts from tax deferral
of income.
Further factors inXuencing plan participation include an indicator of
whether the employer contributes to employee accounts in the form of a
Wxed contribution or a match to employee contributions. Plans with em-
ployer contributions increase the initial return on employee savings and
thus provide an incentive to employees to participate. Because many work-
ers offered a 401(k) plan in our data responded that they do not know if
their employer contributes to accounts, we control for employee knowledge
of employer contributions.3 We also include a variable indicating whether
a worker is covered by a deWned beneWt or non-401(k) deWned contribution
retirement plan. The predicted effect of these pensions is theoretically am-
biguous. They may indicate stronger preferences for saving, in which case
their availability would have a positive inXuence on enrollment in 401(k)
plans, or they may allow retirement saving goals to be attained in the
absence of additional saving through a 401(k) plan.4
This analysis examines 2,532 male and 2,070 female full-time workers
aged 16–64 employed in Wrms offering 401(k) plans, drawn from the 1993
Employee BeneWts Supplement to the April Current Population Survey
(CPS).5 Men and women are examined separately, because of our interest
in examining the implications of the increasing share of women in the labor
force, and because saving decisions at each age may differ by gender and
marital status may affect such decisions differentially by gender. 
401(k) Participation Results
Figure 1 depicts inXuences on the probability of participation in a 401(k)
plan for full-time male and female workers offered plans by their employ-
ers. Age, race, and ethnicity are examined, as well as marital status and the
employment status of spouses of married workers. Bars indicate the differ-
ence in the likelihood of participation of a particular group, ages 16–24,
for example, relative to a reference age group (ages 35–44), calculated as a
percentage of the mean participation rate.6 An asterisk above or below the
bar indicates that this difference is statistically signiWcant at the 5 percent
level or higher.
This Wgure indicates that older male employees are equally likely to par-
ticipate in a 401(k) plan as are middle-aged workers (ages 35–44, the base
group), after holding constant other demographic characteristics and a
number of economic factors predicted to affect saving in a tax-deferred
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employer-sponsored plan. By contrast, middle-aged female employees ages
45–54 (55–64 ) are 13 (30) percent more likely to enroll in a 401(k) plan
relative to the base age group. This suggests that life cycle motivations to
save differ by sex, perhaps due to differential concerns about Wnancing
longer lifetimes, by the enhanced beneWts of tax-deferral among higher-
wage workers, by diverse bequest motives, or by the length of time spent in
the labor force. The results also show that younger workers save less, as pre-
dicted by the life cycle model. Males ages 16–24 are 27 percent, and females
28 percent, less likely to have a positive balance in a 401(k) plan. 
The likelihood of participation in 401(k) plans does not vary signiW-
cantly by race: non-Hispanic black employees and those of other races (pri-
marily Asian) enroll at the same rates as non-Hispanic white employees.
Men of Hispanic origin, however, are signiWcantly less likely (19 percent) to
enroll relative to their non-Hispanic counterparts. 
Married women with nonworking spouses are 24 percent less likely to
participate in a 401(k) plan than are single women, but women with work-
ing spouses are no more likely to participate than single women.7 Neither
marriage nor the working status of a spouse inXuences the participation
decisions of men, however. No other inXuences on this decision, including
control variables not shown in Figure 1, are statistically different between
men and women.8
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Figure 1. 401(k) plan participation by age, race/ethnicity, and sex: percent differ-
ence, full-time workers offered plans. Source: authors’ calculations. Percent change
represents marginal effect on 401(k) participation relative to the sample mean.
* denotes signiWcance at 5 percent level or higher.
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401(k) Contribution Results
Holding a current balance in a 401(k) account may reXect a previous
saving decision that, because of employee inertia, remains in place. In this
case, a more contemporaneous measure of employee saving in 401(k) plans
may therefore be provided by examining whether employees are currently
contributing to their accounts. Figure 2 shows how groups differ relative
to a reference group in their probability of making a contribution during
the current year. The groups examined are employees with positive account
balances by age, race, ethnicity, and by whether the employer provides
matching contributions, the effect of which differs signiWcantly by sex.9
Here age plays no special role for men or women: younger and older
employees are no less or more likely to make a contribution to an existing
401(k) account than are their age 35–44 counterparts. Non-Hispanic black
men and women are, however, 27 and 23 percent, respectively, less likely
to contribute to their accounts than their non-Hispanic white counterparts.
Also, Hispanic women are 33 percent less likely to contribute than non-
Hispanic women. Interestingly, among Hispanics, men are less likely to have
a 401(k) account (Figure 1) and women with accounts are less likely to con-
tribute to them, relative to non-Hispanics. Having an employer who matches
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Figure 2. Current contributions to 401(k) accounts by age, race/ethnicity, and sex:
percent difference, full-time workers with accounts. Source: authors’ calculations.
Percent change represents marginal effect on 401(k) participation relative to the
sample mean. * denotes signiWcance at 5 percent level or higher.
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contributions increases the probability that women contribute by 29 per-
cent, but has no effect on whether men contribute.10
Results for 401(k) Participation and
Contributions for Employees in New Jobs
To provide another measure of decision making regarding 401(k) plans,
we next examine the participation and contribution decisions of full-time
workers with less than Wve years of tenure on their jobs. Among older
workers, new jobs may represent “bridge” jobs after retirement from long-
term career jobs, which are increasing in importance as older workers
extend their working lives, or they may reXect the impact of unanticipated
job changing resulting from the increased incidence of downsizing among
older workers in recent years (Siegel et al. 2001). On leaving an employer,
a worker must make an explicit decision to cash out a 401(k) account or to
roll it over into a new 401(k) account with the new employer, if this option
is available, or into an IRA. Thus, the decision to participate in 401(k) plans
in new jobs offering the option reXects current or recent demand for this
savings vehicle.
To evaluate this, Figure 3 shows differences in the probability of partic-
ipation in a 401(k) plan just for employees with fewer than Wve years em-
ployment in jobs offering plans.11 Age and race/ethnicity patterns differ
from those in Figure 1: men ages 16–24 on new jobs are no less likely to
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Figure 3. 401(k) plan participation by age, race/ethnicity, and sex: percent differ-
ence, full-time workers with tenure less than Wve years offered plans. Source:
authors’ calculations. Percent change represents marginal effect on 401(k) partici-
pation relative to the sample mean. * denotes signiWcance at 5 percent level or
higher.
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participate in 401(k) plans than their counterparts of ages 35–44; however,
older men (45–54) are 28 percent more likely to participate than middle-
aged employees. For women the opposite pattern operates: young women
(16–24) are 46 percent less likely to enroll, but older women are no more
likely to enroll than middle-aged women. 
Non-Hispanic women of “other” races in new jobs are 43 percent more
likely to participate than their non-Hispanic white counterparts, whereas
there is no signiWcant difference between these two racial groups in Figure
1. Hispanic men at all tenure levels (Figure 1) were less likely to participate
than non-Hispanic men; in new jobs, however, there are no differences in
participation between these two groups.12 There are no observed age dif-
ferences in the likelihood of contributing to existing 401(k) accounts in
new jobs among either women or men, and only one racial difference: Non-
Hispanic black women are 46 percent less likely to contribute than non-
Hispanic white women.13 We thus do not provide a corresponding Wgure for
contributions into accounts on new jobs. 
In summary, these age patterns suggest that workers in their 50s and
60s are at least as likely to hold balances in 401(k) plans as workers in their
late 30s and early 40s, other things equal. Furthermore, women ages 45–64
and new male hires ages 45–54 are more likely to participate in 401(k)
plans. On these grounds, we infer that demand for such plans will remain
strong, as the representation of older workers in the labor force increases.
Moreover these patterns suggest that a rising share of women in an aging
labor force will also add to demand for this form of saving. This is because
401(k) participation rates are higher among women ages 45–64 compared
to middle-aged women, than are the rates of older men relative to middle-
age men. Our Wndings also suggest that an increasing proportion of work-
ers of Hispanic origin in the labor force may increase participation in
401(k) plans.
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
It is likely that the future demand for job-based health insurance will also
rise, for several reasons. Health care needs increase with age, boosting
demand for coverage and shifting demand toward medical services most
pertinent to older workers’ health problems. However, the costs of provid-
ing employer-sponsored insurance may also grow: older workers are likely
to require more expensive medical services per health care incident than
will younger employees, and they may also have a higher incidence of med-
ical care interventions. Health insurance will become more costly as em-
ployers pass on increased health insurance costs rather than reduce other
employee beneWts or wages. Price increases can be reXected directly through
increases in employee contributions, co-payments, and deductibles, or indi-
rectly through reductions in covered services and frequency of services.
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Price increases would be expected to reduce the demand for health insur-
ance by some older workers (after controlling for health needs), and since
employers cannot offer differential health packages to younger and older
employees (Reno and Eichener 2000), this will likely curtail younger work-
ers’ demand as well.
An increasing share of women among younger full-time workers might be
expected to expand demand for employer-provided health insurance toward
those related to reproductive services, and away from services directed
toward younger men. The extent of this shift, and the consequent burst in
employer costs, will depend on the relative expenses of these services and
the net increase in demand for insurance. The latter will vary depending on
the extent to which demand for these services by women is already being
met by coverage under husbands’ insurance, and the extent to which in-
creased labor market activity by women further reduces the number of chil-
dren per household. The effect on demand for medical services, and thus
employers’ insurance costs, arising from the increased proportion of women
in the older labor force, depends on whether older women require fewer or
more medical services than older men, or less or more expensive services,
and the extent to which these services are currently covered under family
coverage.
Finally, the extent to which the changing racial and ethnic composition
of the population changes the demand for employer-based health insur-
ance depends on the differential health needs of the populations concerned
and their relative attitudes toward risk. Wide disparities in health status
and insurance coverage have been found across racial and ethnic groups.
Among adults ages 18–64, Hispanics and blacks are more likely than whites
to be in fair or poor health and less likely to be in excellent health (Weigers
and Drilea 1996). Furthermore, lack of insurance is far more common
among Hispanics (35 percent) than among either blacks (25 percent) or
whites (15 percent). Racial and ethnic minorities, particularly Hispanics,
are both more likely to lack access to job-based coverage and to turn it down
when it is available (Cooper and Schone 1997).14
Only 39 percent of full-time workers in the private sector offered health
insurance are offered coverage for themselves fully paid by their employers;
only 22 percent are offered family coverage fully paid by their employers
(McDonnell and Fronstin 1999). Thus, participation in an employer-
sponsored insurance plan is a discretionary decision involving costs to the
majority of workers that must be weighed against competing claims on the
household budget. We posit that the demand for job-related health insur-
ance is a function of current and projected individual and family health
needs, the relative price of employer-sponsored insurance, and individual
and family preferences regarding risk. In the absence of a direct measure
of workers’ health status, we posit that health needs are negatively corre-
lated with education, income, and wealth, and positively correlated with
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age. Since lower income and wealth may be associated with greater liquid-
ity constraints that may inhibit households from purchasing insurance,
however, we are unable to predict a priori the effect of income and wealth,
measured here by family earnings and home ownership, on the demand for
health insurance. Family health needs are measured by the presence of a
spouse and/or minor children. The relative price of own-employer insur-
ance is a function of its price, and the prices of medical services purchased
directly in the market, quality-equivalent individual insurance purchased in
the market, and, for married workers, coverage under a spouse’s plan. Lack-
ing good data on such prices, we include coverage under another health
insurance plan and, for married workers, coverage under a spouse’s plan.
We also control for whether the employer offers workers the opportunity to
obtain coverage at a group rate after retirement. We include sex, race, and
ethnicity to reXect individual and cultural differences in risk preferences. 
To assess the impact of age and labor force diversity on the probability
of participation in an employer-sponsored health insurance plan, we use a
sample of 11,441 full-time workers in the 1993 Employee BeneWts Supple-
ment to the April CPS who reported that they were offered and eligible to
participate in a plan offered by their employer.15 This sample is split by sex
and marital status because the health needs of men and women may differ
over the life cycle and family coverage may be available through spouses’
plans.16 Because information on whether the employer offers retiree insur-
ance is provided only for workers aged 45 and above, we interact a dummy
variable for the availability of retiree insurance with the age categories of
45–54 and 55–64. This interaction term indicates the additional effect of
retiree insurance coverage on the probability of participating in an em-
ployer’s health insurance plan.17 The effect of the age variable alone indi-
cates the probability of participation, relative to the omitted age group, for
workers not offered this option. 
Figure 4 shows how the probability of participating in an employer’s
health insurance plan varies by age, race, and ethnicity for married full-
time male and female workers offered and eligible for coverage, vis-à-vis a
baseline group. Three additional inXuences on the participation decision
— the availability of retiree insurance, education, and the presence of chil-
dren — are also included because their effects differ by sex.18 Participation
rates are very high for both groups: .94 for men and .82 for women (see
Appendix Table 4). Figure 4 indicates that there are statistically important
age differences in the likelihood of enrolling in an employer’s health insur-
ance plan, although the magnitudes of these variations are not large.
Among younger employees, married women ages 16–24 are 9 percent less
likely, and men ages 25–34 are 3 percent less likely, to enroll than employ-
ees ages 35–44, the reference group.
The availability of retiree health insurance is a strong inXuence on the
demand for health insurance among older workers. Among employees in
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Wrms not offering retiree insurance, men ages 45–54 are more likely (by
5 percent) to enroll than men ages 35–44, whereas there is no difference
among women between these two age groups (this difference by sex is sta-
tistically signiWcant). By contrast, both women and men ages 45–64 in Wrms
offering retiree insurance are more likely to participate, by six to 14 percent
more.19
There are also signiWcant racial differences in participation in employer
health insurance. Non-Hispanic black men and women are more likely to
participate (by 4 and 6 percent, respectively) than non-Hispanic white
employees. Non-Hispanic men of other races are also more likely to enroll
(6 percent more).20 Interestingly, a high school diploma or above increases
enrollment in health insurance by men (from 5 to 8 percent depending on
level of education), but not by women. The presence of children decreases
participation by women by four percent, but does not affect the decisions of
men.21 Participation in employer-sponsored health insurance among single
employees does not exhibit the strong age and racial differences observed
for married employees and we therefore do not include a Wgure with results
for this group. The only important age-related effect is higher participation
(by 6 percent) by men ages 45–54 who are offered retiree health insurance
(Appendix Table 3, cols. 3 and 4).22
What are the implications of these Wndings for a changing labor force?
The most striking result is that older workers’ demand for health plans that
include the option of retiree insurance is very strong. Enrollment rates
of older married employees in these plans are signiWcantly higher than in
plans not including this option, and thus likely to increase as the labor force
ages. Delayed retirement may attenuate this change, but on net, it is likely
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Figure 4. Probability of participation in health insurance plan by age, race/ethnicity,
and sex: percent difference, full-time married workers offered and eligible for cover-
age. Source: authors’ calculations. Percent change represents marginal effect on
health insurance.
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that an older workforce will exert increased pressure on employers to pro-
vide retiree insurance. Employer provision of retiree insurance has declined
over time in response to its higher cost, however.23 Thus a reversal of the
trend of the past decade will undoubtedly involve shifting more of the costs
to retirees, constricting some of the expected increase in demand.
Participation in plans with provision for retiree insurance is strikingly
high among older married men and women. If the insurance policy does
not include this option, demand is weaker among women than men, how-
ever. Thus, the effect of an increasing share of women in an older labor
force may be to reduce demand for employer-sponsored health insurance
overall. By contrast, more non-Hispanic non-white employees would be
expected to increase demand for health insurance beneWts.
Employer-Sponsored Disability Insurance
An aging labor force may also inXuence the demand for job-based disability
insurance, which provides partial wage replacement in the case of tempo-
rary or permanent inability to work.24 For one, older workers are more likely
to be disabled, boosting demand for this type of insurance. The price of this
insurance would be anticipated to rise if more claimants comprise a larger
share of an employer’s workforce. This increase in price, whether direct or
through beneWt reductions, would be likely to decrease demand by younger
workers. The cost of short-term disability insurance is usually paid by em-
ployers. However, disability insurance is often included as one of the com-
peting options in a Wrm’s cafeteria health plan so selection of this type of
beneWt may preclude the selection of an alternative beneWt. Employers pro-
viding long-term disability coverage often offer a base wage replacement
rate (40 percent is common) at no or low cost to the employee but provide
higher replacement rates with pro-rated employee contributions. 
To examine the empirical link between demand for job-related disability
insurance and workforce mix, we again turn to the 1993 Employee BeneWts
Supplement of the April CPS. These data do not report workers’ health or
disability status so we again must posit that good health and the absence
of disability are positively correlated with income, education, and wealth
(measured here by family earnings and home ownership), and negatively
correlated with age. We include sex, race, and ethnicity variables to reXect
individual and cultural differences in disability status and risk preferences. 
As above, we examine only full-time workers offered and eligible for
employer-provided health insurance, and who knew whether their employ-
ers provided short-term/long-term disability insurance.25 Unfortunately,
survey respondents were not asked whether they were offered this form of
insurance. Rather, they were asked only if they would receive beneWts if they
became disabled, that is, whether they opted for this type of insurance when
offered. Because we are unable to identify all employees offered disability
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coverage, we use as our sample employees offered health insurance on the
assumption that this group is most likely among full-time workers to have
been offered short- and long-term disability insurance.26 Our Wndings there-
fore provide only rough estimates of differences in take-up rates by age, sex,
race, and ethnicity.27
Figure 5 depicts patterns in the decision to elect short-term disability
insurance among full-time employees by age, race and ethnicity, and two
additional factors whose effects differ by sex — earnings and health insur-
ance coverage.28 There is only one signiWcant age difference and the mag-
nitude is small: men ages 45–54 are 4 percent more likely to elect coverage
for short-term disability than employees ages 35–44, the reference group.
There are also racial and ethnic differences, although once again the mag-
nitudes are small. Non-Hispanic black men and women are 6 and 5 percent,
respectively, more likely to elect coverage than non-Hispanic white employ-
ees. Non-Hispanic women of other races, however, are 8 percent less likely
to opt for this coverage. 
Among both men and women, earnings have small, but statistically im-
portant effects on participation in short-term disability insurance. Interest-
ingly, the direction of the effect differs and this difference is statistically
signiWcant. A 10 percent increase in weekly earnings is associated with a
lower likelihood of enrolling among men, but a higher likelihood among
women (resulting in changes of about 1 percent in participation). Partici-
pating in the employer’s health plan, treated as jointly determined with
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Figure 5. Short-term disability insurance participation by age, race/ethnicity, and
sex: percent difference, full-time workers offered health insurance. Source: authors’
calculations. Percent change represents marginal effect on short-term disability
insurance participation relative to the sample mean. Weekly earnings indicates
change resulting from 10 percent increase in monthly earnings. * denotes signiW-
cance at 5 percent level or higher.
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disability insurance to account for unobserved risk aversion, is associated
with higher enrollment rates for both men and women, but the magnitude
of the effect is signiWcantly larger for men than for women (an increase of
28 percent among men compared to 8 percent for women). 29
Age differences are more striking for participation in long-term disability
insurance than for short-term insurance (Figure 6).30 The youngest women
(ages 16–24) are 23 percent more likely to enroll in coverage for long-term
disability compared to middle-aged women, and women ages 25–34 are 8
percent more likely. Enrollment for disability coverage among women dur-
ing their reproductive years is not unexpected, although it is somewhat
surprising that this pattern is not reXected in short-term disability coverage
as well. Older men (ages 55–64), by contrast, are 13 percent less likely to
opt for long-term disability coverage. The latter Wnding suggests that older
men may have met saving goals so that the loss of earnings does not jeop-
ardize retirement living standards to the extent that it may for middle-aged
employees.31
There are also strong differences by race and ethnicity in participation in
long-term disability insurance, and the pattern varies from that observed in
Figure 5 for short-term disability. Non-Hispanic black men are 10 percent
more likely to opt for long-term disability coverage than non-Hispanic
white men, but non-Hispanic men of other races are 21 percent less likely
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Figure 6. Long-term disability insurance participation by age, race/ethnicity, and
sex: percent difference, full-time workers offered health insurance. Source: authors’
calculations. Percent change represents marginal effect on short-term disability
insurance participation relative to the sample mean. Weekly earnings indicates
change resulting from 10 percent increase in monthly earnings. * denotes signiW-
cance at 5 percent level or higher.
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to elect coverage. Hispanic men are 11 percent less likely to enroll than
their non-Hispanic counterparts. By contrast, there are no differences by
either race or ethnicity among women. 
The effects of earnings on participation are identical to those observed
for short-term disability. Ten percent higher earnings are associated with
a decline in the likelihood of participation among men but an increase
among women. Both effects are small, about a 1 percent change in partici-
pation, but the difference between men and women is signiWcant. The effect
of being married also differs by sex: marriage increases the likelihood that
men will opt for this coverage by 18 percent but does not inXuence enroll-
ment rates among women.32
These Wndings suggest that the increasing participation of women of
childbearing age in full-time jobs is likely to increase demand for long-term
disability insurance, but that an aging labor force is likely to offset this
change. The relatively higher demand among older men for temporary
earnings replacement would be expected to increase participation in short-
term disability insurance, as those of ages 45–54 are going to comprise a
higher proportion of the labor force of the future.
Employer-Sponsored Family Benefits
Over the last two decades, employee compensation packages have become
considerably more complex, due in large part to the addition of a number
of family-oriented beneWts — family leave, Xexible work schedules, unpaid
time off, and child and elder care assistance. Interest in these beneWts
has grown because there are more married women in the labor force and
because increases in the divorce rate and in childbearing outside marriage
have increased the number of single parents in the labor market. These
trends have set the stage for a national debate on how to balance the com-
peting interests of work and family. Polls indicate that the public believes
it is important for employers to provide more “family-friendly policies.”33
Family beneWts are appearing at the bargaining table between employers
and unions; the newest products of collective bargaining include round-the-
clock childcare, health and wellness programs, and access to continuing
education. The evidence presented below suggests that companies are offer-
ing more extensive work/life policies and programs to help workers bal-
ance work and family responsibilities. Anecdotal evidence indicates that
Wrms are also turning to alternative forms of compensation such as allow-
ing parents to bring infants to work and providing childcare, recreation
programs for teenagers, and book clubs for retirees (Belluck 2000; Green-
house 2000). 
Although the development of family-related policies has focused primar-
ily on childcare, eldercare assistance has been on the agenda for at least a
decade. The proportion of the elderly requiring help with daily activities
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increased from 35 percent in 1984 to nearly 43 percent ten years later
(Tracey 2000). Middle-aged and older workers are thus more likely to face
greater demands on their time from elderly parents and relatives, and inter-
est in work arrangements such as Xexible scheduling and assistance with
arranging elder care is likely to increase in the future.34
In this section, we examine trends over time in the proportion of employ-
ees offered family-related beneWts. We use published data for 1989–97 from
the Employee BeneWts Surveys (EBS) in Medium and Large Firms of the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. We also use published data for 1995 and 2000
from the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) Establishment Surveys and
the related Employee Surveys commissioned by the Department of Labor.35
Changes over time in the proportion of full-time employees in medium
and large Wrms offered various types of family beneWts are shown in Table 1.
The proportions of full-time workers offered family beneWts such as child-
care, adoption assistance, and long-term care insurance increased slightly
over time, but eldercare assistance increased substantially between 1989
and 1993, the only years for which data are available. Flexible beneWts plans
and reimbursement accounts allow employees to pay for expenses such as
childcare, eldercare, and medical care deductibles not covered by other
plans on a salary reduction basis.36 The proportions of employees offered
these plans increased from 13 percent in 1988 to 54 percent in 1995, but
then decreased to 45 percent in 1997. Coverage for medical beneWts such
as well-baby care and immunization increased substantially from 31 and 29
percent, respectively, in 1988, to 66 and 52 percent in 1997. This evidence
suggests that in recent years an increasing proportion of employees in
medium and large Wrms have been offered family-related beneWts.
While there was little change between 1988 and 1997 in the percentage
of employees offered paid time off, the proportion offered unpaid leave
increased considerably during this period. The proportion of employees
offered unpaid maternity leave increased from 33 to 60 percent, and the
proportion offered unpaid paternity leave increased from 16 to 53 percent.
Following the introduction of FMLA in 1993, which requires employers to
provide unpaid leave but does not address the issue of paid leave, the pro-
portion of full-time employees offered unpaid family leave (both maternity
and paternity leave) increased from 84 percent in 1995 to 93 percent in
1998.37
The FMLA Establishment Surveys of 1995 and 2000 provide information
on the proportion of Wrms offering family-related beneWts. While only 11
percent of establishments are covered by the FMLA, they represent 58 per-
cent of all employees (Cantor et al. 2001). Among Wrms covered by the
FMLA, 84 percent offered all Wve types of beneWts mandated by FMLA
in 2000, whereas only 34 percent of noncovered establishments offered
these beneWts. The gap, moreover, had narrowed since 1995, when 88 per-
cent of covered establishments offered beneWts, compared to 21 percent of
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noncovered establishments. It appears that uncovered establishments were
increasingly providing family beneWts in order to compete with covered
establishments in a tight labor market. However, the majority of uncovered
establishments do not provide all beneWts mandated by the FMLA, and
many grant family and medical leave “depending on the circumstances,”
and not always to all employees all of the time (Cantor et al. 2001). 
We now turn to the FMLA Employee Surveys of 1995 and 2000 to exam-
ine the characteristics of employees exercising family beneWt leave options
provided under FMLA. The proportion of workers taking leave remained
fairly constant (about 16 percent) between 1995 and 2000 (Table 2). In
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Table 1. Family BeneWts: Percentage of Full-Time Employees Offered Coverage
1988 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Medical beneWts
Well-baby care 31 34 36 48 60 66
Immunization and 
innoculation 29 28 30 37 47 52
Family beneWts
Child care 4 5 8 7 8 10
Adoption 5 5 8 7 11 10
Elderly care na 3 9 31 na na
Long-term care 
insurance na 3 4 6 6 7
Flexible beneWt 
plans and/or
reimbursment
accounts 13 24 37 53 54 45
Employee assistance 
programs 43 49 56 62 58 61
Family time-off beneWts
Paid
Personal leave 24 22 21 21 22 20
Maternity leave 2 3 2 3 na na
Paternity leave 1 1 1 1 na na
Family leave na na na na 2 2
Unpaid
Maternity leave 33 37 37 60 na na
Paternity leave 16 18 26 53 na na
Family leave1 na na na na 84 93
Source: Author’s tabulations from EBS in Medium and Large Firms, U.S. BLS (selected
years).
* After passage of the FMLA in 1993, maternity and paternity leave are included in the
broader category of family leave. Family leave includes paid and unpaid leave for maternity,
adoption, care of a newborn child, and family illness. Also included is short-term leave,
which is paid time off from work for reasons such as childrens’ medical appointments and
parent-teacher conferences.
na = not available.
04chap3.qxd  1/9/03  10:10 AM  Page 73
both years, the most common reasons for the longest leave were the employ-
ee’s own health, care for a newborn or newly adopted child, and care for an
ill parent. Between 1995 and 2000, the incidence of leave-taking for own
health decreased from 61 to 47 percent. At the same time, the incidence of
leave-taking to care for an ill parent increased from 8 to 11 percent, and for
an ill spouse, from 4 to 6 percent. Leave-takers in both years were more
likely to be female and middle-aged (35–49). Over the Wve-year period, the
proportion of leave-takers ages 50–64 increased by one-third (from 15 to 20
percent).
We might have expected that, with the introduction of FMLA in 1993,
the proportion of employees taking leave would have increased more than
indicated in Table 2. There are many reasons, however, why employees may
be reluctant to take up this option — concerns shown in the bottom panel
of Table 2. More than half of all employees reported that they worried
about not having enough money to pay bills, and about one-quarter worried
either that their job might be lost or that a leave would hurt advancement.38
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Table 2. Employees Taking Leaves from Work: Reason for Leave by Demographic
Characteristics 
Leave-takers as percentage of employees 1995 2000
Reason for taking the longest leave 16 17
Own health* 61 47
Maternity-disability* 5 8
Care for a newborn, newly
adopted, or placed foster child 14 18
Care for ill child 9 10
Care for ill spouse* 4 6
Care for ill parent* 8 11
Demographic characteristics
Sex
Male 44 42
Female 56 58
Age
18–24 11 10
25–34 30 28
35–49 41 40
50–64* 15 20
65+ 3 2
Concerns about leave
Job might be lost 27
Leave might hurt job advancement 26
Seniority would be lost 13
Not having enough money for bills 54
Other reasons 13
Source: Derived from Cantor et al. (2001).
* Denotes signiWcant change between 1995 and 2000 surveys.
04chap3.qxd  1/9/03  10:10 AM  Page 74
We now examine the distribution of reasons for leave by age and sex in
1995 and 2000 (Table 3). For both men and women, the largest change over
this period is the shift from leave-taking for one’s own health reasons to
leave-taking for family concerns. In 2000, both men and women were more
likely to take leave to care for an elderly parent and men were more likely
to take leave to care for a newborn or older child than in 1995. Men and
women of all ages, and particularly employees age 35 and older, were much
more likely to take a leave in 2000 to care for parents than Wve years previ-
ously. We expect this trend to continue as the baby boom generation ages
and experiences increased care-giving demands from parents. Younger
leave-takers (ages 18–34) were more likely to take maternity disability leave
and to care for a newborn, adopted, or foster child. 
Respondents in the 2000 FMLA Survey of Employees were asked whether
their employers provided beneWts other than those covered under FMLA.
A high proportion (45 percent) reported that they were offered Xextime;
43 percent reported they were offered employee assistance; and 25 percent
reported they were offered job sharing (Figure 7). These proportions match
quite closely the proportions of employees rating the respective beneWts as
important (the largest discrepancy is unmet demand for Xextime) and sug-
gest that employers are responding to the needs of their workforces. 
In summary, the evidence conWrms that family-oriented beneWts have
become an important part of the employee compensation package. Increas-
ingly, Wrms are providing beneWts that accommodate the work-and-family
pressures felt by an increasing share of employees. As the workforce ages and
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Figure 7. Employees offered beneWts not covered under Family and Medical Leave
Act and perceiving beneWts as important. Source: Cantor et al. (2001). 
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the share of women continues to increase, we expect that family beneWts
will become an even larger part of employee compensation. An enhanced
beneWt package, however, is likely to come at a cost to the employee in terms
of lower wage growth. As a result, wage compensation can be expected to
comprise a smaller share of total compensation (Gruber 1998).
Conclusions
An aging labor force, with increasing shares of women and minorities, is
likely to change the mix of nonwage compensation offered by employers
and desired by employees. There is little evidence that older workers have
any lesser interest in saving through 401(k) plans than workers in their 30s.
Indeed, older women at all tenure levels are more likely to maintain 401(k)
accounts, as are older men in new jobs. The frequency of contributions into
these accounts, moreover, does not diminish with age. Not surprisingly,
demand for health insurance is greater among older employees, especially
if it includes the option of coverage after retirement at group rates. We
predict that demand for short-term disability insurance will increase, but
demand for long-term disability will decrease, because earnings replace-
ment for older workers is more critical in the short run than over an
extended period that may approach, or exceed, the expected remaining
work life. 
Finally, we foresee an increased demand for a wide range of family-
related beneWts due to the increasing family-and-work needs of women with
children and of middle-aged and older workers of both genders with elderly
parents. Changes in the provision of these beneWts in the last few decades
suggest that employers appear to be responding to these needs and that the
compensation package for future workers may be more beneWts intensive
than its current conWguration.
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Notes
1. We thus refer to 401(k) plans and non-401(k) deWned contribution plans.
2. At the time the data used in this study were collected (1993), the limit on
employee contributions was $10,500 and the total of employee and employer con-
tributions could not exceed the lesser of $35,000 or 25 percent of the employee’s
salary. These limits were in effect through 2001 and were raised in the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of May 2001, effective 2002.
3. Some 40 percent of men and 46 percent of women among full-time workers do
not know if their employer contributes to their retirement account. Our empirical
analysis uses a two-stage procedure to Wrst estimate the probability of an employer
match as a function of individual, Wrm, and industry characteristics, controlling for
knowledge of the match, and second we include the predicted value of the match in
both participation and contribution equations.
4. We exclude tenure on the current job because there is no theoretical basis for
including tenure in a savings function. Several analysts have found longer tenure,
when included as an exogenous variable, associated with a higher probability of par-
ticipating in a 401(k) plan (Andrews 1992; Even and Macpherson 1995; Munnell et
al. 2000). Even and Macpherson (1999), however, found tenure insigniWcant when
treated endogenously. Our preliminary analysis conWrmed their Wndings so we omit
it as a regressor in our analysis. 
5. The 1993 supplement is the last of three CPS supplements (earlier surveys
were in 1983 and 1988) providing detailed information on a number of employer-
sponsored beneWts. Currently there are no plans to continue this series. The sam-
ples from the 1993 supplement used in this analysis exclude part-time employees
and the self-employed as well as workers for whom critical data are missing. We
exclude part-time employees because the saving functions of the youngest and old-
est workers in particular, whose decisions are of special interest in this study and
who have relatively high rates of part-time employment, may differ depending on
whether they are in part-time or full-time jobs. Overall, offer and participation rates
are higher for full-time employees (39 and 68 percent, respectively) than for part-
timers (14 and 41 percent, respectively). 
6. Estimated mean participation rates are 0.63 for men and 0.53 for women
(Appendix Table 2; this table also includes mean values of explanatory variables).
These results are based on proWt estimations of the probability of participation in
401(k) plans that control for education, earnings, home ownership, pension cover-
age, and whether the employer contributes to the 401(k) plan. Marginal probability
estimates appear in Appendix Table 1, cols. 1 and 2. Reported marginal probabilities
and differences by sex are based on an interaction model using a pooled sample. 
7. Because we include a variable for whether an employee’s spouse is working, the
bar in Figure 1 for being married represents the effect of being married on 401(k)
participation for employees with a nonworking spouse. The bar representing a
working spouse shows the additional effect of having a working spouse. The effect
on participation of being married and having a working spouse is measured by the
sum of the two effects. 
8. A number of other factors were found to signiWcantly inXuence the partic-
ipation decisions but these effects did not differ between men and women (see
Appendix Table 1). A 10 percent increase in earnings increases the probability of
participation by 3 percent among both men and women. Among men, having a col-
lege degree increases the probability of participation by 22 percent relative to par-
ticipation among high school dropouts. Homeownership increases participation by
women by 21 percent. Being covered by a deWned beneWt or non-401(k) deWned
contribution pension, treated as jointly determined with participation to remove
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unobserved tastes for saving, increases participation by women by 11 percent. The
presence of an employer matching contribution, also treated as an endogenous
inXuence, increases the probability of participation among men and women by 19
and 28 percent, respectively. 
9. SpeciWcally, survey respondents are asked whether they intend to make a con-
tribution in the current year. Marginal probability estimates appear in Appendix
Table 1 (cols. 3 and 4). Among employees with 401(k) accounts, the estimated mean
probability of intending to contribute is 0.63 for men and 0.66 for women (Appen-
dix Table 2). About 25 percent of account holders reported that they did not know
if their employers matched their contributions.
10. Two other factors inXuence contribution decisions but do not differ signiW-
cantly between men and women. As in the case of the participation decision, a col-
lege degree increases (by 22 percent) the likelihood that men will contribute to their
accounts and having a pension increases (by 15 percent) the likelihood that women
will contribute. 
11. Marginal probability estimates appear in Appendix Table 1, cols. 5 and 6. The
estimated mean probability of participation in new jobs is 0.47 for men and 0.40 for
women (Appendix Table 2). 
12. One other important inXuence on participation in 401(k) plans differs
between all jobs and new jobs (see Appendix Table 1, cols. 5 and 6). For men and
women at all tenure levels, an employer match is a powerful incentive to participate,
but not for employees in new jobs. Other inXuences on participation are similar
between the two groups of jobs. Among women, being a homeowner and having a
pension plan increase the probability of participating in a 401(k) plan in both
cases. Higher weekly earnings also increase participation in both cases for men and
women alike.
13. Small cell sizes may contribute to the lack of signiWcant contribution effects
among workers in new jobs. Marginal probability estimates appear in Appendix
Table 1, cols. 7 and 8. Contribution rates are signiWcantly lower (by 26 percent) for
men with nonworking spouses, and 31 percent higher for women whose employers
match their contributions. Among employees in new jobs who have a 401(k)
account, 61 percent of men and 64 percent of women expect to contribute in the
current year (Appendix Table 2). 
14. Based on data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey and the
1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), the authors Wnd that the rate of
access to job-based insurance for Hispanic workers fell from 71 percent in 1987 to
67 percent in 1996, although it remained stable for other groups. Take-up rates
declined from 1987 to 1996 for all racial/ethnic groups, and take-up rates of His-
panic workers were signiWcantly lower than those of white workers in both years.
15. As above, we exclude part-time employees, the self-employed, and those for
whom critical data are missing. 
16. The four subsamples consist of 5,664 married men, 3,733 married women,
790 single men, and 1,254 single women.
17. Workers in the omitted category, ages 35–44, may be in Wrms offering retiree
insurance. To the extent that their decision to participate in their Wrm’s health plan
is inXuenced by this option (which we believe unlikely), the marginal effects for
age 45+ represent lower-bound estimates of the effect of the availability of retiree
insurance. 
18. The results shown in Figure 4 are based on proWt estimations of the proba-
bility of participation in employer-sponsored health insurance, and control for
coverage under spousal and other types of insurance, weekly earnings, homeowner-
ship, and employment status of spouse. Marginal probability estimates appear in
Appendix Table 3 (cols. 1 and 2). 
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19. The bars above variables “Age 45–54” and “Age 55–64” indicate the probabil-
ity of enrolling (relative to ages 35–44) of employees in Wrms not offering retiree
insurance, while the interaction terms, “Retiree HI *Age 45–54” and “Retiree HI
*Age 55-64,” indicate the probability of participation by employees offered retiree
health insurance (relative to ages 35–44). 
20. This is not the case for women of other races, and the difference by sex is
signiWcant.
21. Several other control variables are signiWcant but their effects do not differ
by sex. Coverage under spouses’ insurance reduces participation among men by
14 percent and among women by 17 percent; coverage under other insurance
decreases participation by 11 by men and by six percent by women. (Both variables
are treated as jointly determined with the decision to participate in one’s own
employer plan.) A 10 percent increase in weekly earnings increases participation
by both men and women, although the magnitudes of the effects are small (about
1 percent). Having an employed spouse increases the likelihood of participation
among men by 9 percent and among women by 11 percent. Homeownership de-
creases participation among women by 2 percent.
22. A number of other factors are important for the participation decision, how-
ever. Coverage under other insurance signiWcantly reduces participation by both
men and women by 16 percent. Ten percent higher earnings increase enrollment by
women by 1 percent, and homeownership increases participation by men by 5 per-
cent. The estimated mean probability of participation is .93 for single men and .94
for single women (Appendix Table 4).
23. In medium- and large-size private Wrms, the proportion of full-time employ-
ees participating in employer medical plans who were provided with the option of
retiree health insurance fell from 45 percent in 1988 to 35 percent in 1997 for
retirement below age 65, and from 37 to 34 percent for retirement at ages 65 and
above (McDonnell and Fronstin 1999).
24. In medium and large establishments, 53 percent of full-time workers were
covered by short-term disability and 42 percent by long-term disability insurance in
1995; among small establishments, comparable percentages were 29 and 22.
25. The samples used here consist of 6,451/5,660 male and 5,118/4,352 female
full-time workers.
26. Among Wrms offering health insurance, 71 percent offered short-term dis-
ability insurance and 49 percent offered long-term disability insurance (Gruber
1998).
27. These estimates are biased if, within the sample of workers in Wrms offering
health insurance, workers of a particular age would be more or less likely to match
themselves with Wrms that also offer disability insurance.
28. Marginal probability estimates appear in Appendix Table 3 (cols. 5 and 6).
The estimated mean probability of participation is 0.82 for men and 0.87 for
women.
29. Also notable is the Wnding that education plays an important role in the deci-
sion to opt for short-term disability insurance, one of the rare instances in this study
in which education inXuences the choice of employer-sponsored beneWts. Among
men, a high school diploma and above increases participation by 10 to 24 percent
(depending on level of education) compared to participation among high school
dropouts; among women, participation increases by 10 to 18 percent. Being mar-
ried is associated with a higher likelihood of participation among men (by 11 per-
cent), whereas homeownership increases participation by 5 percent among women. 
30. Marginal probability estimates appear in Appendix Table 3, cols. 7 and 8. The
estimated mean participation rate is 0.71 for men and 0.62 for women.
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31. Because of the limitations of the data, it is also possible that workers in this
age group, while eligible for health insurance, are less likely to be employed in Wrms
that offer long-term disability insurance. 
32. Participation in the employer’s health plan, controlling for unobserved pref-
erences for insurance, is associated with higher participation among both men and
women, in contrast to participation in short-term disability coverage (by 56 and 50
percent, respectively). Like enrollment in short-term disability insurance, higher
education signiWcantly increases the probability of participation among both men
(from 11 to 28 percent) and women (13 to 19 percent).
33. See, for example, Family Matters: A National Survey of Women and Men, con-
ducted for the National Partnership For Women and Families, February 1998
(<www.nationalpartnership.org/survey/survey.htm>). 
34. Johnson and Lo Sasso (2000) Wnd that among adult children with surviving
parents, 26 percent of women and 15 percent of men aged 53–63 reported that they
spent at least one hundred hours caring for or helping parents during the previous
twelve months. Women engaged in eldercare were found to have reduced hours of
paid work by 43 percent on average and men by 28 percent. 
35. The EBS data are at the Wrm level and employee characteristics are not avail-
able. The Establishment Surveys allow us to examine Wrm response to employee
demand, while the Employees Surveys provide information on changes over a Wve-
year period in the utilization of family beneWts by the demographic characteristics
of employees. 
36. A Xexible beneWts plan, often called a cafeteria plan, allows participants to
elect a combination of various taxable and tax-deferred forms of compensation,
including cash, health insurance, 401(k) plan contributions, life insurance, child
care, and additional vacation days. A Xexible spending (reimbursement) account
allows employees to set money aside on a pretax basis for qualiWed unreimbursed
medical or dependent care expenses. These accounts may exist either within a full
Xexible beneWt plan or separately as a stand-alone plan. They can be funded by
salary-reduction arrangements, employer contributions, or both. Employees must
determine how much they wish to contribute to the spending account in advance
and they forfeit unused funds at the end of the year.
37. The 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act enables working families to take leave
to meet essential caregiving responsibilities without the risk of losing their jobs or
imposing undue burdens on employers. The FMLA obligates employers with more
than 50 employees to provide 12 weeks of unpaid leave each year to employees for
Wve reasons: own health; maternity leave; care for a new born, newly adopted, or
placed foster child; care for spouse; or care for elderly parents. Leave provided
under FMLA is job-protected, and requires covered employers to continue to main-
tain group health insurance beneWts for eligible employees on FMLA leave. Prior to
1993, the United States had no national family and medical leave legislation,
although the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1979 did require Wrms that offered
temporary disability programs to cover pregnancy like any other disability. Some
employees had access to leave through union contracts, employer policies, or state
statutes, but coverage provided under these provisions was rarely as comprehensive
as coverage under the FMLA. Many employees had no family or medical leave cov-
erage prior to the FMLA. 
38. Among those who indicated that they needed leave but did not take it, 78 per-
cent said they could not afford to take leave. Many feared that either their job might
have been lost (32 percent) or advancement would have been hurt (43 percent). In
addition, 21 percent of leave-needers reported that their leave request was denied by
their employer (Cantor et al. 2001).
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